Distributed grid systems offer possible benefits in terms of fast computation of tasks. This is accompanied by potential drawbacks due to their openness, the heterogeneity of participants, and the unpredictability of agent behaviour, since agents have to be considered as black-boxes. The utilisation of technical trust within adaptive collaboration strategies has been shown to counter negative effects caused by these characteristics. A major challenge in this context is the presence of colluding attackers that try to exploit or damage the system in a coordinated fashion. Therefore, this paper presents a novel approach to detect and isolate such colluding attackers. The concept is based on observations of interaction patterns and derives a classification of agent communities. Within the evaluation, we demonstrate the benefit of the approach and highlight the highly reliable classification.
INTRODUCTION
Technical systems increasingly face cooperation and interaction partners for which no valid estimation of behaviour is available, cf. . One particular instance of this problem class are distributed grid computing systems. In such a system, agents can join and leave at any time, decide about their resource sharing autonomously, and behave selfishly. Thereby, the goal of participation is to parallelise computational load -while offering resources during idle times. Consequently, the basic idea is a kind of tit-for-tat strategy.
In order to allow for a stable system, malicious or uncooperative agents have to be isolated. This is typically achieved by introducing technical trust -more precisely, a modelling of expected behaviour in terms of reliability and trustworthiness based on observed behaviour in interactions (Kantert et al., 2014) . This has been shown to result in robust behaviour for certain stereo-type agent behaviour (Klejnowski, 2014) . A major issues that has been neglected so far is the presence of colluding attackers. This refers to groups of malicious agents that try to exploit or damage the system by coordinated behaviour. This paper introduces a novel concept to detect colluding attackers by analysing the interaction and trust patterns within the underlying community of participating agents. Therefore, we discuss the concept of a system-wide observation and control loop that follows the adaptive control pattern from the Organic Computing domain (Tomforde et al., 2011) . Afterwards, we demonstrate how the perceived information can be utilised to detect and isolate such groups of malicious agents efficiently.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the Trusted Computing Grid as application scenario. This includes the agents' goals and classes, as well as details about trust and normative control aspects. Afterwards, we specify the particular challenge addressed in this paper, which is then substantiated by the developed approach as presented in Section 3. Section 4 evaluates the concepts and demonstrates the success. Section 5 compares the presented work with the state-of-the-art. Finally, Section 6 summarises the paper and gives an outlook to future work.
APPLICATION SCENARIO
As a possible application scenario, we investigate open grid computing systems which can host numerous distributable workloads, e.g., distributed rendering of films. The system is considered open since there is no central controlling entity and all communication is performed peer-to-peer. Worker nodes belong to different administrative domains. Thus, good behaviour cannot be assumed. Nodes participate voluntarily to submit work into the system and, thereby, increase the speedup of their jobs. However, they also have to compute work units for other submitters.
Agent Goal
To analyse such systems, we model nodes as agents and run a multi-agent system in simulation. Every agent works for a user and periodically receives a job, which contains multiple parallelisable work units. It aims to accomplish all work units as fast as possible by requesting other agents to work for it. Since we consider an open system, agents behave autonomously, and can join or leave at any time.
The system performance is measured by the speedup σ. In Equation (1), t self is the time an agent would require computing a job containing multiple work units without any cooperation. t distributed represents the time to compute all work units of one job with cooperation of other workers including all communication times. As a consequence, the speedup can only be determined after the results of the last work unit have been returned.
If no cooperation partners can be found, agents need to compute their own work units and achieve a speedup value of at most one (i.e., no speedup at all). Especially when a worker fails to finish a job or decides to cancel it, the speedup value will suffer and be less than one. Communication overhead also decreases the speedup. However, we assume that jobs require significantly more computing time than communication time and this overhead to be negligible. In general, agents behave selfishly and only cooperate if they can expect an advantage. They have to decide which agent they assign tasks to and for which agents they perform jobs themselves. We do not control the agent implementation, so they might behave uncooperatively or even maliciously.
Worker and Submitter Component
Each agent consists of a worker and a submitter component. The submitter component is responsible for distributing work units. When an agent receives a job containing multiple work units, it creates a list of trusted workers. It then requests workers from this list to cooperate and compute work units, until either no more work units or no more workers are left. If all workers were asked, but unprocessed work units remain, the agent computes them on its own. The worker component decides whether an agent wants to work for a certain submitter. When the agent receives an offer, it computes its rewards for accepting or rejecting the job. There are different strategies based on reputation, workload, and environment. If the reward of accepting the job prevails, the agent accepts the job. It may cancel the job later on, but typically it computes the job and returns the results to the submitter (Klejnowski, 2014) .
Open Systems and Benevolence
In contrast to classical grid computing systems, we do not assume the benevolence of the agents (Wang and Vassileva, 2004) .
In such an open system, we cannot control the implementation of agents and, therefore, the system is vulnerable to different kinds of attacks. For instance, a Freerider (see section 2.5) could simply refuse to work for other agents and gain an advantage at the expense of cooperative agents. Another attacker might just pretend to work and return wrong results. Also, combinations of both or alternating behaviour are possible. Furthermore, attacker can collude to exploit the system.
Trust and Norms
To overcome such problems of an open system where no particular behaviour can be assumed, we introduce a trust metric. Agents receive ratings for all their actions from their particular interaction partners. This allows others to estimate the future behaviour of a certain agent based on its previous actions. To perform this reasoning, a series of ratings for a certain agent can be accumulated to a single reputation value using the trust metric. Autonomous agents need to become aware of the expected behaviour in the system. Therefore, we influence the desired actions by norms. These norms are valid for an Action in a certain Context and, thereby, guide the agents. To enforce the behaviour, they impose a Sanction if violated or offer an Incentive if fulfilled.
In this scenario, good trust ratings are used as an Incentive and, to the contrary, bad trust ratings impose a Sanction. Based on the norms, agents receive a good rating if they work for other agents and a bad rating if they reject or cancel work requests. As a result, the society isolates malevolent agents and maintains a good system utility in most cases. Generally, agents with higher reputation values have a higher chance to get their work units computed. We call this system a Trusted Desktop Grid (Klejnowski, 2014) .
Since agents are considered as black boxes, they cannot be controlled directly from the outside. Each agent is autonomous and selfish. However, we want to influence the system to optimise itself regarding performance and robustness. Therefore, we introduce norms to change the incentives and sanctions for all agents.
Agent Types
We consider the following agent types in our system:
• Adaptive Agents -These agents behave cooperatively. They perform tasks for other agents who earned good reputation in the system. The reputation value generally depends on the estimated current system load and how much the input queue of the agent is filled up.
• Freeriders -Such agents do not work for other agents and reject all work requests. However, they ask other agents to accomplish tasks for them. This increases the overall system load and decreases the utility for well-behaving agents.
• Egoists -These agents only pretend to work for other agents. They accept all work requests but return faked results to other agents, blocking other agents as they have to validate the results. On the other hand, if results are not validated, this may lead to wrong results. However, Egoists lower the utility of the system.
• Cunning Agents -These agents behave well in the beginning, but may change their behaviour later. Periodically, randomly, or under certain conditions, they behave like Freeriders or Egoists. Such behaviour is hard to detect and may lower the overall system utility.
• Altruistic Agents -Such agents will accept every job. In general, this behaviour is not malicious and increases the system performance. However, it hinders isolation of bad-behaving agents and impacts the system goals.
Challenge
Unfortunately, in an open distributed system attackers can collude to gain advantages. In the Trusted Desktop Grid (TDG) colluding attackers can pretend to work for each other which results in good reputation. Other agents will happily work for those attackers. Still, the attackers do not have to work for other agents if they can generate enough fake ratings inside their group. In this paper, we focus on Freeriders which collude as a group. They pretend to work for each others all the time (at a normal work rate) and give out good ratings for fake work to each other. Other stereotypes could execute the same pattern but Freeriding is the best exploitation strategy when an agent has a high reputation. To identify colluding attackers, we introduce a higher level Norm Manager (NM) which consists of an observer and a controller component. It monitors work relations of all agents and collects reputation metrics. Based on this information, it creates a work graph with agents as nodes and edges between agents which have cooperated in the monitored period. The intensity of the cooperation between two agents determines the weight of the edge connecting them. Additionally, the controller creates a trust graph with agents as nodes and trust relations as edges. Trust relations between agents can be obtained from the reputation system (Kantert et al., 2013) .
APPROACH
Since we cannot see the internals or implementation of agents, we need to observe them from the outside. We could monitor interactions between agents, but this may lead to a bottleneck in larger systems. However, it is easy to monitor the actions indirectly: We can observe the reputation system and use the ratings which agents give their partners after every interaction. When we collect those ratings, we can build a trust-graph. Multiple ratings will be merged using an arithmetic mean.
Afterwards, we calculate some common graph metrics for every node. Using statistics, the global system state gets rated. Based on this metrics, we form clusters and detect groups of similar agents. By further classifying these groups, we achieve an even better understanding about potentially occurring attacks. In the end, the observer is able to tell when the system is under attack, categorise the type of the attacks, and rank how severe the attack is. There will also be an estimation about the accuracy of this information.
Requirements on Clustering Algorithms
To find colluding groups of agents, we need a graph clustering algorithm which fulfils the following requirements: 1. Dynamic Cluster Count -Typically, we do not know the total number of different agent groups in advance. Therefore, we require an algorithm which can find a dynamically changing number of groups. 2. Weighted Cyclic Non-Symmetrical Graph -The algorithms has to work directly on a weighted graph where distances are not symmetrical d(x, y) = d(y, x), cycles may exists and, especially, the triangle inequality d(x, z) ≤ d(x, y) + d(y, z) does not hold (Khamsi and Kirk, 2011) . 3. Semi-deterministic/Order-invariant -The clustering is performed periodically while the underlying graph slightly changes. However, the resulting clusters should not change fundamentally. Some algorithms alternate between two different results when the input changes only marginally. This often happened with our previous approach. Therefore, we require a similar output when the input changes only slightly (Jardine and Sibson, 1971 ). 4. Non-connected Components -The graph is not necessarily always connected. Some agents or even groups may be permanently disconnected from the other groups. The algorithm has to be able to cope with this requirement. Starting with (Schaeffer, 2007) and based on this analysis, we choose Markov Cluster Algorithm (MCL) (Van Dongen, 2001 ) as a suitable algorithm for graph clustering which uses flow simulation. MCL is deterministic, can handle edge weights and can find a dynamic amount of groups. Additionally, we choose Affinity Propagation Clustering (AP) clusters which is based on message passing and can find variable numbers of clusters. Therefore, both meet our requirements and can be used with directed or undirected edges.
Markov Clustering
Markov Clustering Algorithm (MCL) (Van Dongen, 2001 ) is based on simulation of stochastic flow in networks. It runs iteratively on a matrix M which contains all connections between nodes and performs two steps:
In the expansion step the matrix gets coincided by a normal matrix multiplication. This spreads out the flow and makes the matrix more homogeneous:
Afterwards, the matrix is inflated which simulates the contraction of flow. Mathematically is uses Hadamard power followed by a diagonal scaling:
MCL has a runtime complexity ofv O(Nk 2 ) with nodes N and edges k which is sufficient for our application. An exemplary run of MCL is shown in fig. 2 .
Affinity Propagation Clustering
Another algorithm is Affinity Propagation Clustering (AP) which works (like MCL) in two steps. It initialises two matrices responsibility R and availability A which store probabilities and are initialised with 0. s(i, j) describes is the edge weight in our graph. In each step, AP updates responsibility and availability (see fig. 4 ). First, the responsibility matrix R is updated:
Afterwards, the availability matrix A is updated:
The complexity of AP is O(n 2 ) with n being the number of nodes which is sufficient for our application. An example with six iterations is shown in fig. 3 . (Frey and Dueck, 2007) .
Rating of Results
To rate the results of the clustering, we use metrics which are similar to Precision and Recall used in information retrieval systems. Additionally, we want to condense them to only one value. In an ideal clustering, every group (attackers, cooperating agents, etc) has its own cluster which contains only agents of that group. First, we measure the share in a cluster i for group t in ClusterShare t,i :
Similarly, we calculate the share of the group t for cluster i in GroupShare t,i :
To create a total measure, we weight the score of each cluster based on the amount of clusters a group is in using w t,i :
Based on that, we create the TotalShare t of ever group t:
ClusterShare t,i · GroupShare t,i ·w i,t
RELATED WORK
Our application scenario is a Trusted Desktop Grid system. These systems are used to share resources between multiple administrative authorities. The ShareGrid Project in Northern Italy is an example for a peer-to-peer-based system (Anglano et al., 2008) . A second approach is the Organic Grid, which is peer-to-peer-based with decentralised scheduling (Chakravarti et al., 2004) . Compared to our system, these approaches assume that there are no malicious parties involved and each node behaves well. Another implementation with a central tracker is the Berkeley Open Infrastructure for Network Computing project (BOINC) (Anderson and Fedak, 2006) . All those systems solve a distributed resource allocation problem. Since work units can be computed faster when agents cooperate, such systems reward and, thus, maximise cooperation. Additionally, a high fairness value ensures equal resource distribution (cf. (Jain et al., 1996; Demers et al., 1989; Bennett and Zhang, 1996) ).
We model our grid nodes as agents. Agents follow a local goal which differs from the global system goal (Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994) . We consider agents as black boxes which means that we cannot observe their internal state. Thus, their actions and behaviour cannot be predicted (Hewitt, 1991) . Our Trusted Desktop Grid supports Bag-of-Tasks applications (Anglano et al., 2006) .
Normative Multi-Agent Systems
This work is part of wider research in the area of norms in multi-agent systems. However, we focus more on improving system performance by using norms than researching the characteristics of norms (Singh, 1999) . Our scenario is similar to management of common pool resources. According to game theory, this leads to a "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin, 1968) . However, Ostrom (Ostrom, 1990 ) observed cases where this did not happen. She presented eight design principles for successful self-management of decentralised institutions. Pitt et al. (Pitt et al., 2011 ) adapted these to Normative Multi-Agent Systems (NMAS). NMAS are used in multiple fields: e.g. (Governatori and Rotolo, 2008) focuses on so-called policy-based intentions in the domain of business process design. Agents plan consecutive actions based on obligations, intentions, beliefs, and desires. Based on DL, social agents reason about norms and intentions.
In (Artikis and Pitt, 2009) , the authors present a generic approach to form organisations using norms. They assign a role to agents in a normative system. This system defines a goal, a process to reach the goal, required skills, and policies constraining the process. Agents directly or indirectly commit to certain actions using a predefined protocol. Agents may join or form an organisation with additional rules.
The normchange definition describes attributes, which are required for Normative Multi-Agent Systems (Boella et al., 2009) . Ten guidelines for implementation of norms to NMAS are given. We follow those rules in our system. According to (Savarimuthu and Cranefield, 2011) , Normative Multi-Agent Systems can be divided into five categories: Norm creation, norm identification, norm spreading, norm enforcement, and network topology. We use a leadership mechanism for norm creation and norm spreading. For norm identification, we use data mining and machine learning. For norm enforcement, we use sanctioning and reputation. Our network topology is static. Our approach was evaluated using our agent-based Trusted Desktop Grid simulation. All experiments were repeated fifty times using another random seed. The system consists of 100 agents with 10 colluding Freeriders (FRC) as attacker and 90 wellbehaving adaptive agents (ADA). The simulation runs for 160.000 ticks. We rate our results according to the average TotalShare t (see section 3.4) for every 50.000 ticks as shown in table 1. Additionally, we present two exemplary experiments for MCL and AP in figs. 5 and 6. We evaluated MCL in three variants: (i) using the undirected trust graph; (ii) using the work graph; Detecting Colluding Attackers in Distributed Grid Systems 203 and (iii) using the directed trust graph. AP was is only shown for the undirected trust graph because it cannot work on directed graphs.
EVALUATION
As shown in fig. 5 , MCL (undirected) performs very well to find the group of colluding Freeriders. Additionally, it finds a large cluster with adaptive agents but some additional small clusters with adaptive agents exist. It converges quickly and already shows good results after 5.000 ticks (see table 1; MCL UD) and gradually improves until the end of the experiment. Therefore, it perfectly fits our usecase.
Affinity Propagation Clustering (AP) performs similar when clustering adaptive agents. However, it fails to find a good cluster for colluding Freeriders as shown in fig. 6 . Results for ADA improve over time but FRC stay at a low level (see table 1; AP).
Both MCL on the work graph and MCL directed perform good to find adaptive agents (see table 1 ; MCL Work and MCL). However, they archive very bad results for colluding Freeriders.
CONCLUSION
This paper described the problem of colluding attackers that try to exploit or damage distributed grid systems. We explained that utilising technical trust as basis for cooperation decisions mitigates the negative effects of malicious elements but does not allow for countering coordinated groups of malicious elements. Therefore, we introduced a system-wide detection technique that is able to identify and isolate such groups of agents. To demonstrate the potential benefit and the success of the developed technique, we analysed simulations of a trusted desktop computing grid. Therein, we considered different groups of stereo-type agent behaviour and highlighted the successful identification of even coordinated attacks. Using the Markov Clustering Algorithm on the undirected trust graph performs well to solve the challenge of detecting colluding attackers in the Trusted Desktop Grid. Affinity Propagation Clustering did not fit for our needs. In future work, the group information will be used to isolate agents by introducing norms into the system. Current and future work is concerned with a generalisation of the concept by shifting the focus towards other application scenarios. We further develop a generalised threat model to verify that all expected meaningful attack types can be handled by the devel-oped mechanisms. Finally, the approach is combined with distributed accusation strategies that further improve the efficiency of the isolation effects.
